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After being a worldwide threat, Chinese apparel industry is facing a double challenge:  
1 - Either to remain a low cost base in the international value chain using low wage 
advantages with a double threat: not being able to control apparel world value chains 
and depend strongly on Western companies good will. On the other hand, Western 
companies  can  look  for  other  low  cost  advantage  Asian  countries  or  favor  near 
shoring strategies by relocating businesses in closer locations (as North Africa and 
Central East Europe).  
2 – or going on the value chain at home, with more capital intensive and more 
qualified  labors  could  give  an  advantage  to  Chinese  companies,  controlling  the 
quality, adding more value to the products, changing its position in the value chain 
but with the obligation to find new markets, to set up new distribution channels and to 
keep  its  new  competitive  advantage  (productivity,  quality)  both  on  domestic  and 
international markets. 
The paper describe Chinese apparel private companies facing that challenge, making a 
typology of different strategies. We will describe the different actors who are shaping 
the new world value chains: Chinese bosses, local governments, traders and westerns 
companies. 
 
China’s industrial take-off surprised economists, but it now lasted for twenty years 
with the industrial growth rate still higher than 10%. China has changed scales. China 
has become richer, and the world as well. But  is it possible to take stock of this 
growth that has transformed the industrial landscape of the world as a whole. Its size, 
one-fifth of the world population, makes difficult an appraisal of its economy. No one 
had anticipated China’s take-off which happened while researchers were driven to 
despair to see an under-developed country win an autonomous industrial take-off. It is 
widely known that fortunes appear in China. Factories close in Europe apparently due 
to competitions from China. Does China’s happiness build on our unhappiness? It is 
true that things are connected, but the links are more complex than they seem. I’ll set 
out to make a review of the situation by taking apparel industry.  
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The clothing industry is  primarily  a labor-intensive industry. Twenty  years ago,  it 
represented a substantial proportion of the workforce in most countries of the world. 
Now, these jobs went largely from the high-wage countries. Many Western brands 
preferred to relocate their own factories, focusing on design and marketing.  
 
The Chinese clothing industry is therefore seen as a threat to other clothing industries 
mostly in the emerging world. Northern Europe, Japan or the United States, produce 
virtually no more cheap clothes. Such a manufacturing technology reached a stage 
that  economists  call  mature;  that  means  every  country  can  easily  learn  and 
manufacture clothes of medium quality. Thanks to its lower labor costs, and it ability 
to increase production quickly if necessary, China manages to get a strong part of 
world apparel exports. 
Thus a substantial part of the clothing in the world is manufactured in China. The rise 
of  Chinese  clothing  exports  was  so  abrupt  that  most  developed  countries  have 
requested the introduction of protectionist measures to protect their employees, or at 
least to give a little time to convert. Measures were prosecution for dumping, higher 
customs  taxes  or the  establishment  of  quotas  on  certain  products  for  some  years. 
Quotas turned out to be the most effective even if the Chinese manufacturers managed 
to export more than allowed. Taking advantage of Chinese difficulties in applying the 
rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), quotas have been extended several 
times before disappearing.  
But  prices  paid  to  Chinese  companies  are  very  low.  Companies  from  Western 
countries  are  making  much  larger  margins  than  those  of  their  Chinese  suppliers. 
Design seems the main problem. Chinese companies apparently are unable to find 
designs that will enable them to increase their margins.  
 
To  sum  up,  European  and American  countries  lost  their  jobs  because  of  Chinese 
products paid less by the same European and American countries. And even the same 
Chinese plants have seen their jobs threatened by neighboring countries with even 
lower  wages.  Even  before  the  financial  crisis,  from August  2008,  we  found  that 
Chinese clothing of many manufacturers slowed sharply and cut their workers for lack 
of order. What happens? 
 
Chinese Apparel Industry Challenge 
It is therefore obvious that the Chinese clothing export industry margins went down, 
so it becomes harder to find the necessary funds to maintain a competitive industry. 
The rising of China wages and costs could be seen as proof of success. Maintain this 
success must rely on new means. We visited many owners of Chinese plants who 
opened their doors and their accounts in order to get our suggestions to maintain their 
growth. Most of these factories are managed by the same family who created them. If 
these plants often have more than a thousand employees, their machines are usually 
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low. So organization and management  of human resources  often are  neglected by 
employers. Employers appear to find no difficulty whether they have to expand their 
factory or hire new workers, or managers.  
Factories barely have direct contact with their clients. They use to be are approached 
by external agents or intermediaries. Foreign clients use to send a garment designed 
and manufactured by them and ask the factory to make the best copy of it. If the copy 
is  good,  client  orders  with  very  little  discussion  on  the  price  because  everybody 
knows the competitors’ price.  
 
Several local government in Cantonese districts found a way to encourage the take-off 
of an export industry that we call the "same same clusters”. When local governments 
identify manufacturers that have some success, they allow any manufacturer eager to 
do the same to settle next to the first factory and copy its formula. A few years later, 
these same governments establish B 2 B market to gather all producers in the same 
place. This is very attractive effect to clients. They soon realize that in these markets, 
they are sure to buy all the products they want at the lowest prices on the market. This 
staging of a competition between local producers facilitated the industrial take-off, 
because  it  reduces  costs  and  difficulties  of  entry.  But  it  came  at  the  expense  of 
investment capacity of these same companies.  
 
Methodology 
For this article, the groundwork mostly is our systematic observation of industrial 
development of the delta of the Pearl River (China region of Guangdong). Chinese 
researchers and also French and Latin American researchers worked as a team that 
finally  established  in  2000  a  Sun  Yatsen  University  laboratory  in  Canton.  The 
management of a Chinese university social science laboratory by a European searcher 
(the author) is unique; it represents a remarkable basis of support for studying the 
local  economy.  Thus,  the  work  of  French  and  Chinese  academics  leaded  to  a 
cumulated information on the Canton industrial environment. Since 1989, we traveled 
through the delta visiting the factories that have multiplied there. Regularly, Chinese 
private entrepreneurs are met for investigations or consulting operations. Each time, 
information on their origin and their training is collected.  
Unfortunately  it  is  very  hard  to  get  reliable  statistics.  The  category  of  “private 
industrial  owners”  do  not  appears  clearly  in  the  Chinese  statistics  which  mix  the 
forms  of  ownership.  During  the  last  two  years,  a  research  project  on  innovation 
abilities  of Chinese factories involved researchers from  Lyon3,  IRD, Paris5,  IRD, 
Euromed  Marseille,  Guangzhou  SUN  Yatsen  University,  Beijing  Social  Science 
Academy, Beijing Ministry of Science and Technology and permit the collection of 
most of the needed data for this paper.  
 
Basically,  the  analysis  of  apparel  value  chain  started  from  identifying  Chinese 
factories  producing  these  products.  We  traced  the  process  of  each  product  from 
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(manufacturing,  distribution,  retailing  and  services,  etc.).  We  focused  on  the 
interactions and relations among the designers, multinationals, local producers, and 
final users around the circulation of the specific product. For each actors, including 
the Chinese companies (which are often only factories), we tried to find out which 
other actors (i.e. other factories or companies) could replace it and how to understand 
how these actors are included in the value chain. We figured some alternative value 
chains of the product.  
 
This kind of value chain tracing can bring the following results: 
 
-  A  clear  cartography  of  value  chains  in  textile  industries  across  European, 
American and Chinese companies. Alternative value chains of automobile and 
textile  industries  across  China  and  Europe,  which  means  the  value  added 
activities in which both Chinese and European companies can enter, but avoid 
for the moment. 
-  An evaluation of the distribution of gains of every product sold to final users, 
among different actors and different companies which engage in value-added 
activities of it. 
-  A  description  of  coordination  linkages  among  different  actors  along  value 
chain. 
-  A summary description of labor conditions of each actor along the value chain. 
-  An evaluation of sustainability of different forms of value chain as industrial 
solution  of  modern  production.  For  this  purpose  we  used  the  diagnostic 
method of productive effectiveness developed by Ruffier (1996, 2006, 2008). 
 
We  interviewed  textiles  clusters  authorities  and  scientists. We  discuss  with  textile 
professional  worldwide  (EC  authorities,  Chinese,  French,  North Africa  and  Latin 
American bosses. We interviewed distributors (Carrefour, Decathlon, traders…) 
 
How the Chinese apparel industry became a threat to other national apparel industries 
 
Apparel industry played an important role in the industrial take-off of China and in 
securing  a  very  positive  trade  balance.    Guangdong  probably  knew  the  fastest 
development in China. 
This development is due to private initiatives. Most of Apparel private bosses created 
their factories by themselves and have devoted a large part of their gains making them 
profitable. Theses bosses were not rich. If they had money, it would have be more 
profitable to invest their money in real estate, which ensures good incomes with little 
effort. Industry requires from the employers an investment of all of their energy for a 
level of profitability that is generally rather smaller. Private industrialists exploit their 
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Too few specialists are interested in the question of profitability of investment in the 
industry of developing countries. It is much more profitable to invest in the industry 
of  industrialized  countries.  Average  investors  do  not  turn  toward  the  industry  of 
developing countries. If they did so, the question of industrial development would be 
resolved. It may be considered that these industrialists of development make a bad 
calculation.  Their  underlying  motivations  must  be  questioned,  because  strong 
motivations are needed to embark on primitive industrialization. 
 
A characteristic common to a number of private employers of Guandong is surprising 
to the analyst who supposes that it was necessary to have evident assets in order to 
succeed: most of them have not done complete secondary studies. But, actually, it is 
the contrary that should surprise. To be a member of the Communist Party or to take a 
complete  secondary  cycle,  in  China  means  a  training  fulfilling  respect  for  public 
planning more than adaptation to the market. In some way, the envelope that was 
given to secondary students and Party members did not familiarize them with the hard 
laws of the market. Private employers having escaped this conditioning were able to 
develop aptitudes and opinions more adapted to ownership activities than those that 
stem from a formatting by the Party. Being an owner is to claim for yourself most of 
the value created by employees’ work. This is not communist philosophy. If the owner 
is Communist, he has little chance to succeed in establishing capital. And he cannot 
count on the heritage, since everyone was poor in 1980. Nor can he count on the 
financial  system  since  it  is  reserved  for  public  enterprises.  To  progress,  Chinese 
private employers had to act outside of socialist standards. They had everything to 
fear from a government that defends a philosophy opposed to theirs. 
 
They acted by hiding themselves at a maximum. Chinese private employers learned 
on the job how to succeed in establishing commercial relations, a field in which they 
excel. They all show great ability in taking advantage of market opportunities. Selling 
ability is probably one of the keys for the explanation of the industrial takeoff of the 
Delta. Chinese private industrialists are first of all people who have created business 
networks by trust relationships between production actors. In a world dominated by 
bureaucrats,  they  can  only  succeed  if  the  essentials  of  their  activity  escape  their 
control.  This  is  why  they  prefer  verbal  promises  more  than  written  commitment, 
secret accounting more than analytic accounting. Actually, their success is not based 
on techniques learned in school but more indeed on the school of life, brawls and 
shrewdness. 
 
For more than 30 years, Guangdong has been in advance of the rest of China (Vogel, 
1989). This gives it an attractiveness for all qualified personnel who imagine that the 
opportunities are greater there than elsewhere. Therefore, private entrepreneurs hardly 
have any trouble in finding graduates if they have need of them. They find them, at 
least  they  find  sufficiently  qualified  persons  to  make  their  rather  rudimentary 
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In a work written in 1999, Wang analyzes the operation of the private sector. Wang 
considers that the bureaucracy would assign a position of expedient to the private 
sector. He rightly stresses the proliferation of administrative agencies, regulations and 
licenses that are the common lot of the management of the market economy and the 
private sector in China today. The state enterprises have access to loans in a royal 
manner; they have the monopoly of exports, which requires private  enterprises to 
enter into dependent relationships with them. Sovereign predators, the foreign trade 
companies take the very profitable differences that exist between international prices 
and  domestic  prices,  while  the  private  firms  can  only  profit  from  minor  price 
differences within China. Actually, everything is happening as if the government was 
developing a capitalist economy without authorizing the growth of a true industrial 
bourgeoisie. If it is known that the workers do not have the right to freely choose their 
unions, it is forgotten that private employers simply do not have the right to belong to 
an  association.  They  may  not  establish  lobbies  that  would  negotiate  with  the 
government. Most of bosses associations belong to Communist Party. Those that do 
not depend on the Communist Party are either mutual associations between patterns 
from  the  same  region  (organizations  that  are  more  or  less  secret),  or  they  are 
organizations that seem to have as its object the training of their members.   
 
Having read Porter, the Chinese authorities gave the State the function of assuring 
establishment of competition among private  companies. And in fact, as soon as a 
private owner succeeds in gaining a market, the authorities facilitate the installation of 
competitors just next to him who are going to copy the innovator, make his margins 
decline and at the same time are going to increase the volume of production while 
lowering the prices of the products. The State will also construct immense specialized 
markets which will become convenient places to find the best prices since all of the 
domestic producers will be strongly encouraged to come to offer their products in 
their competitors’ milieu. This strategy explicitly aims at fighting unemployment. It 
also aims at increasing China’s power in the world.  
 
But if the State has the means to think of an advanced strategy, it takes away from 
private enterprises the possibility of investing, by forbidding them from really earning 
much  money.  Here  is  one  of  the  reasons  that  explain  it:  despite  the  very  great 
industrial  growth  of  the  region  of  the  Pearl  River  delta,  salaries  have  not  grown 
greatly, with the notable exception of those of specialists who are lacking and can thus 
sell themselves at very high prices. In his strategic works, Michael Porter (1999) gives 
keys  to  enterprises  who  attempt  to  fight  against  the  entry  into  competition.  This 
strategy is opposed to the imitation of the others and to benchmarking. Actually, if the 
firms seek to imitate another firm, they position themselves as behind the first, which 
already  puts  them  in  difficulty.  Furthermore,  if  they  come  to  compete  with  the 
imitated firm, they can only do it by reducing the commercial margins and therefore 
their profit. It is by focusing themselves on what is most appropriate for their firms 
that productive niches can be found where it would be difficult to be imitated.  It is 
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is  permitted  to  them,  facilitated  by  proximity  and  the  impossibility  for  the 
entrepreneurs to group together in order to make their own law. By forbidding any 
grouping of private entrepreneurs, the Chinese system has maintained the bourgeois 
class in the bureaucrats’ shadow. 
 
We will now get into the analysis of current strategies of Chinese clothing enterprises. 
In fact, we can classify the companies according to their size, the percentage of their 
export activity, their ability to design, and market (existence of a network of dedicated 
sales, use of advertising, etc). This simple typology can separate companies that are 
doing  well  from  those  who  are  now  in  difficulty.  Starting  by  them:  the  Chinese 
clothing companies who experiment the greatest difficulties today are the big factories 
whose  business  was  more  than  80%  devoted  to  export.  These  companies  are 
paradoxically those who carried the industrial take-off. Trying to understand what 
happens to them. In fact, these companies operate on the mode of the OEM, ie do not 
design their clothes: they produce according to client instructions. This puts them in a 
situation of high dependency, and clearly make them unable to grasp the changes. 
  
OEM Apparel Global Value Chain 
OEM is one of the best ways to enter the industry to export. Indeed, it requires very 
little initial knowledge. You must be able to operate a factory and to copy a product. 
But it is not necessary to know the final consumer as the client is responsible for 
marketing. It is not necessary to have design ability since the design is given by the 
client.  Finally,  it  is  not  necessary  to  have  financial  capabilities,  customers    just 
hesitate little to advance raw materials, even make advance payments because it has 
good financial situation and knows that we obtain prices from actors who have no 
financial, or access to credit.  
 
OEM do make things easier for Chinese bosses. Their clients teach them the quality; 
they  often  help  to  overcome  technical  difficulties.  As  Chinese  entrepreneurs  of 
clothing mostly are first generation entrepreneurs, they had very few knowledge of  
what is a capitalist enterprise that works. They have to adapt and invent in many 
areas. A client who tell them exactly how to fit the requirements of the market is a 
great opportunity for them.  
 
Clients are not philanthropists. They train Chinese companies in accordance with their 
interest. They are not teaching anything about design, or market analysis. Clients do 
not want their Chinese suppliers to be their competitors. Most of them do not look for 
continuity in the relationship. As a result, they have not warned Chinese suppliers 
when they started to find cheaper suppliers in neighboring countries. They began to 
test these new suppliers and disappeard sometimes without notice. Even before the 
onset of the financial crisis of autumn 2008, we saw many factories suddenly finding 
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For these plants the shock was all the harder: they always seemed far too small, their 
clients  made  larger  and  larger  commands  and  suddenly  fell  silent.  Often,  the 
workshops of these plants were already deserted in summer 2008. 
 
Guangdong  authorities  were  aware  of  the  fragility  of  their  markets,  they  tried  to 
change the model. After rather favored the maintenance of low wages to increase local 
employment  and  foreign  exchange  reserves,  they  switched  strategy,  looking  to 
improve social harmony by better wages, better social benefits and better environment 
protection. In the early 2000s, margins were still good and the authorities could rely 
on high tax revenues. But with internal and external competition, margins and tax 
revenues both declined. A new social policy on the environment has been defined for 
Guangdong. Now it was announced that the Chinese laws on labor, social security 
contributions and the environment would not only be tightened, but their compliance 
will be insured. Companies with low margins, low wages and low environmental laws 
compliance  will  have  to  move  into  less  developed  parts  of  China,  or  disappear. 
Guangdong will keep only the strong and good companies, as Germany seems to do.  
 
2008 financial crisis deteriorated employment to the point of creating social unrest, 
forcing  local  authorities  to  be  very  pragmatic.  Thus,  municipalities  begun  to  pay 
themselves salaries for missing workers whose factories were bankrupt. They finally 
turned a blind eye to the area of small shops, most of which do not respect the labor 
law. So that, in some companies, workers suffered sharp wages declines. Or, more 
often,  having  lost  their  jobs,  they  accepted  a  wage  reduction  in  more  or  less 
unregistred workshops. Failure to report allows authorities to choose to see or not 
these workshops. If the authorities want to close these workshops, it is sufficient that 
they are illegal. If they prefer that these workshops continue to operate, they may say 
they are not aware of their existence since they are not reported. Indeed, our field 
observations in Guangdong showed that in 2009, these small shops are rather more 
active than a year ago. However, their margins are reduced and interviewed bosses 
often stated that they don’t get rich but just survive. 
 
Next coming is the analyses of the value chains in which Chinese clothing OEM. For 
example, a pair of jeans manufactured in a Chinese factory that we were able to study 
in depth. The client of the plant is a French brand that provided the design and will 
market in the world. We were able to know or estimate the costs and benefits of each 
link  in  the  chain  that  goes  from  the  idea  of  making  this  jean  to  its  purchase  by 
consumer. Let us see how a pair of jeans paid 3.2 € to a Chinese factory is sold € 50 to 














































1  9 
Great brand relocating its production (if shown)  
Distribution of gains jeans sold for 50 € 





Chinese  textile 
factory 
Raw material  1  1   




2  3   
Chinese  factory 
boss 
Margin boss  0,2  3.2   
French Brand  design  0,1  3.3   
  Boat  0,2  3.5   
  Customs  0,5  4  Less than 15% 
Chinese  State 
Plant 
quotas  0 à 0,5    Quotas  could  be  paid 
directly  to  state  plant  or 
bought on black market 
         
French Brand  distribution  20  24   
French Brand  Market studies  5  29   
French Brand  Advertising  15  44  Sale  price  is  a  function  of 
the volume of advertising.  
French Brand  Marges   6  50  Estimated 
 
The purchase price of cotton by Chinese manufacturers of jeans seems among the 
lowest in the world. The cost of manufacturing it is around three to four times lower 
than it would be in France, but little lower than in Eastern Europe and higher than in 
neighboring countries such as Vietnam, Burma or Laos, significantly higher than in 
Central Africa. When margins are integrated, China is becoming competitive in Africa 
and  Eastern  Europe.  Indeed,  one  of  the  biggest  surprises  of  this  survey  was  that 
Chinese  bosses earnings  are lower than those of  bosses in  North Africa or  South 
America. There is an acceptance of them taking the entrepreneurial risk for less gain 
than in most countries. 
 
The  design  cost  is  relatively  small.  That  is  to  say  that  it  is  not  design  cost  that 
preclude a Chinese design. 
 
Jeans  can pile up in  large numbers  in  shipping containers, so transport costs and 
customs do not weigh heavily in the value chain. They could double it would not alter 
the balance between manufacturers of jeans in different countries of the world. Quotas 
have a variable price because there was a market official and black market quotas in 
China.  The  Chinese  office  has  a  tendency  to  allocate  quotas  to  inefficient  states 
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Distribution costs are too often underestimated. Selling a pair of jeans cost many 
times more than producing it. Luxurious shops are expensive. Working time devoted 
to the sale is also much greater than that spent in the manufacture and this is also 
reflected in the price distribution. 
 
Once all these costs taken into account, it remains two important things to consider. 
The first is "market studies" which aim to know what type of jeans consumers will 
want  to  buy. This  includes  very costly  surveys  on consumers who live mainly in 
countries  where  labor  is  expensive.  The  last  and  not  the  least  cost  is  that  of 
advertising. The more advertising, the more consumers want to buy jeans and are 
willing to pay more for it. The advertising is probably the most risky link in value 
chains:  he  reaches  amounts  generally  outside  the  scope  of  Chinese  bosses.  It  is 
probably also the most profitable. It is the investment capacity which structures the 
domination in the global value brand jeans. Large western brands derive most of its 
gains and domination power from their investments in advertising.  
 
OEM bosses are aware that most of the market value of the product escapes them. 
They wonder how to increase their share of the value. We worked with the Chinese 
boss of this example. He is a realistic and inventive man who can count on political 
support. He tried everything to improve his situation. He sold surplus jeans products 
with the logo of the French company. It was very profitable but too risky, if he was 
caught he could lose at once all his clients. He also sold the same jeans without logo. 
In this case, the prices he gets are still good, but risks of losing clients are too strong, 
and he concluded not to go on that way.  
 
We advised him to rather develop its own models in China and sell them in its own 
networks. He had already established its brand and opened shops. But it failed to 
invest enough money in the transaction and the network proved to be a financial shot 
for him. So he began to seek ways to sell directly abroad. With officials in his district 
and other contractors we organized a discovery mission in France in Spring 2008. We 
strongly suggest them to invest together in a commercial office in France, but the 
bosses were not prepared to put together commercial means, they chosed to embark 
on their own. From January 2009, most of their plants stopped or became slow. 
 
 
Selling inland  
Anyway, some enterprises developed distribution networks inside of China and began 
to do some market studies in the not too far factory zone. That way, they have been 
able to make a design accepted by local consumers and to make their brand known. 
These  factories,  if  big  enough,  are  not  enduring  any  crisis  effect,  because  the 
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Half-luxury takes off in China. The time comes to sell more sophisticated products, 
more fun. The problem of Chinese bosses is their lack of notoriety, and notoriety is 
necessary to create a consumers’ loyalty link. Bosses who worked on the notoriety 
starting with the immediate environment of their plant were soon able to make much 
higher margins. They use this money to gradually enlarge the area of their notoriety. 
The ones who reached this level are doing very well. Their numbers increase through 
the  action  of  some  local  governments.  (Particularly  Humen  and  Xiqiao,  in 
Guangdong). Indeed, accumulating the money through their B to B markets, some 
local governments started to work on marketing, making market studies, branding and 
design. There is no doubt that despite collapse of entrepreneurs who fail to work their 
markets, some areas are in the process of drawing the Chinese way of the future. They 
have already started to export in the border areas of southern China. However, it is 
never easy for local authorities to invest in marketing. A large proportion of public 
managers have engineers’ background. They see the progress as the result of better 
control of nature. Marketing, market studies sound a bit unrealistic to them. 
A huge consumer market is developing in China starting a race to gain the knowledge 
and confidence of new buyers. Foreign companies are investing heavily in market 
studies and advertising in China. They try to take up before local competitors will be 
strong enough to do equivalent market studies and equivalent advertising campaigns. 
No one knows how many Chinese brands will succeed. 
 
Selling too far away  
Economists  tend  to  have  a  national  vision  for  businesses,  while  businesses,  even 
small,  cannot  even  think  in  terms  of  national  interest,  but  local  and  global 
opportunities. In fact, our value chains surveys shows that there are much more varied 
situations we imagined at first. We said that the main difficulty to achieve capacity to 
generate investment in the clothing was to pay the entry ticket to be known by global 
consumers.  According  to  this,  it  is  cheaper  to  act  nearby.  But  we  may  have  a 
reputation locally and remotely. This is the case with this chino-Lebanese firm. The 
owners are Lebanese. They have always been in the clothing and had achieved certain 
notoriety in the Middle East. With the accumulated capital, they were able to explore 
other markets and by chance they made their way to several supermarket chains in 
Spain where they are now known.  
 
These employers decided to leave Lebanon, where they had their main production 
units.  The  loss  of  their  largest  plant  has  prompted  employers  to  try  their  luck 
elsewhere: they landed in Canton. They quickly realized they would have no difficulty 
for finding factories which are capable of manufacturing the models they had in their 
cartons.  Since  they  were  small,  they  preferred  an  alliance  with  a  Chinese 
manufacturer, rather than always seeking the cheapest price. To ensure the reliability 
and loyalty of their supplier, they just paid twice as much as the market price. Thus, 
they have reconstituted their productive force. They had their brands, their models, 
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decided to create a design studio in Canton and had little difficulties in getting an 
Italian designer they knew. Today, they are doing fine. Let’s see a value chain for 




Lebanese selling small business in Spain and making the design in Canton  
Distribution of earnings for a particular jean sold 50 € 





Chinese  textile 
factory 
Raw material  1  1   




2  3   
Chinese  factory 
owner 
Owner margin  2  5.   
Lebanese  design 
workshop  
conception  0,1  5,1  Designers  are  Italian  hired 
by the Lebanese. 
  Boat  0,2  5,3   
  Customs  0,7  6  Less than 15% 
Chinese  State 
Plant 
quotas  0 à 0,5    Depending  on  quotas 
market  




distribution  20  28   
Lebanese 
Company 
Market studies  10  38  Expensive  as  the  company 
in a outside country  
Lebanese 
Company 
advertising  2  40  Advertising is done only in 
the supermarket 
French Brand  Margin  10  50  Estimation  
 
Let us start by reading the table from top to bottom. The Chinese factory  enjoys 
exceptional prices for cotton. Manufacturing costs the same as in previous example. It 
gives the Chinese owner a more comfortable margin. Costs of design, transport and 
customs are the same as in the previous example. The Lebanese are working with a 
trader, which usually covers a margin of one third of the cumulative cost. Highest 
costs are those associated with market studies and advertising. These costs remain 
affordable for employers of Lebanon: their market studies are limited to niche markets 
they have known for a long time. Advertising is only done inside supermarkets which 
sell products. The cost of marketing is the relatively same as that of the French brand, 
but volumes are much less consistent and remain within the reach of Lebanese bosses. 
Here a small company  manages a niche business.  It maintains its market through 
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Conclusion: who is winning and who is losing in Chinese apparel 
industry? 
 
Chinese central government was certainly the first winner. Around 50 to 70% of the 
jeans made in China are exported. The Chinese government banks cash in on the 
currencies and transform them into local currency. This power uses one part of the 
profits from growth to strengthen the country’s industry: it buys huge quantities of 
foreign  technologies,  it  develops  the  country’s  infrastructure,  it  finances  a  real 
industrial policy, it makes up for a major part of  unfathomable deficits of government 
enterprises and it makes restructuring from public to private easier. Central and local 
governments now have financial means to attempt the transition from a copy-based 
industry to an innovative industry. Indeed the relevance of some applied measures can 
be  questioned.  We  do  think  that  too  much  state  money  is  dedicated  to  high 
technologies  at  the  detriment  of  those  which  are  now  the  most  necessary  to  the 
progressive upgrade of Chinese industry. Chinese bosses are not able to compete with 
foreign brands because they lack money to do market studies and advertisement.  
 
Mingongs: the workers also benefited from the Chinese industrial take-off. Not so 
much the government workers who have seen their relative position fall back and 
sometimes even their financial situation deteriorate when their company has been up 
against bankruptcy. Some of them continue to  get an  « iron rice bowl  » that is a 
protected life supported by a company that ensures them bed, meals, hospital and 
school. But the real beneficiaries are the new workers, who have left the countryside 
for the cities. The figures are clear; the main part of the turnover of the factories has 
gone to pay the workers’ wages. They are therefore the main beneficiaries. If we 
hesitate to concede to it, it’s because their fate hardly appears enviable to us any 
longer. To make clothes, farmers can be hired, trained in a few weeks and given a 
sewing machine.   
 
We interviewed many Chinese farm workers called Mingongs. They remind us a lot 
of the immigrant workers who have enabled the France to strengthen its economy 
after  world  war  two.  Mingongs  don’t  work  in  a  foreign  country,  but  they  still 
theoretically lack of required permits to work in cities whose language and numerous 
customs were unfamiliar to them. And nevertheless they came. They accept any jobs 
even with eight days of journey. Their fate does not seem enviable. But when they are 
asked if they want to return to their families inside their villages, they generally reply 
that they in fact wish to have their families come to the city. Actually it is enough to 
imagine  life  in  their  village  to  understand.  The  young  people  have  deserted  the 
country and the young who remain do not often find a lot of interest in remaining in 
villages  with  old,  jobless,  penniless  people  doomed  with  a  bleak  future. The  city 
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One must not believe that the remote countryside gains as much from the urban take-
off. Recent studies reveal that the migrant workers send money for about two years 
and afterwards they forget. The loss of jobs which mainly affects young migrants, that 
is to say those who last arrived, is an expression of today crisis. But older migrants 
can’t be at rest either. They can either go back to their homeland, which many would 
rather avoid to do, or agree to be paid less. Governmental policies try to send them 
back to the countryside with social and fiscal advantages drown to soften the shock. 
In fact, if the industrial growth slowed, the Chinese agricultural fourth world would 
take off.  
 
Western brands: they are the big winners of outsourcing. When we split up the cost 
price of a pair of branded jeans, we see that less than 5% pays the Chinese make. The 
brands justify the prices paid by consumers for quality, i.e. less than 5% of the price 
and for the design, which rarely represents more than 1% of the price paid by the 
consumer. In fact, western brands take advantage of the progress of industrialization 
that has lowered the manufacturing and marketing prices, creating a desire in buyers 
to buy more expensive products. As a matter of fact, the biggest expenses incurred by 
a western brand are for market studies and advertising campaigns. That’s convenient 
for  salaried  employees  who  prefer  to  have  these  jobs  rather  than  dressmaking, 
especially as more attractive incomes are offered for brand manufacturing than true 
jeans manufacturing. But these margins earned by western brands are going to be 
increasingly difficult to justify. They are mainly dependant on advertising. Saviano in 
a currently well-known book on the camorra of  Naples shows that it succeeds in 
obtaining the best margins from apparel trafficking than cocaine trafficking. All it 
does is make good copies of branded apparel and sell them, without paying anything 
for the brands, but in shops that sell these brands, which it controls secretly.  
 
We can close doing the round of winners of clothes globalization by having a thought 
for those who have not won it. The consumers are among them because they hardly 
gain from the progress of industrialization, or from the lowering of the production 
costs  brought  about  by  outsourcing.  The  salaried  employees  of  the  so-called 
middleman countries like Mexico, Turkey or Tunisia have terribly suffered from the 
rise in power of the Chinese competitors. They have seen their salaries come down 
and their factories close down.  
 
Private Chinese bosses: It is quite interesting to look into the situation of private 
Chinese entrepreneurs of the garment industry. The Chinese industrial take-off owes 
them a lot. They have registered an exceptional growth from 1982 to 2007. They have 
often set off without any money, without any security, dragging into their adventure 
salaried employees exploited at will, and themselves working without rest to earn a lot 
less money than their counterparts from rich or middleman countries. First generation 
of capitalists, they had ideas or comportments that did not tally with the communist 
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often already paid a heavy price for unconventional behaviors. For them the opening 
up was an opportunity to get out from the top: they were quasi delinquents, they 
become modern heroes. Then they had faltered before risks. A capital is not made 
legally  in  a  socialist  society.  They  have  cheated,  bought  the  complicity  of  civil 
servants, won over a maximum of friends to prevent jealously from sending them to 
prison. They have accepted really low margins than in most of the other countries. It 
is a thing that we do not measure enough, with their Mercedes class E or S, the private 
Chinese bosses are  often poor bosses. They  are incapable of finding the required 
funds for a real modernization of their factories. They cannot launch good market 
studies. In other words, they don’t stand a chance confronting western brands. They 
are small fry. And today they are encountering real difficulties. They are challenged 
by manufactures from Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and indeed black Africa who manage 
to strike a lower price by paying the lowest salaries. They are overwhelmed by a new 
industrial policy of the central government that seeks to obligate them into paying 
official salaries, social security contributions, anti-pollution equipment, reducing their 
already low margins accordingly.  
 
The die is not cast for all that. Chinese producers could resume their development by 
trying to conquer the market next door and gradually set up Chinese brands there. We 
see some of them embarking on such a strategy successfully. If they re-conquer only 
the Chinese market, they will become the big ones capable of canvassing the western 
countries later. And then, the model western companies that only do marketing are a 
delicate model. How to control quality, innovate in high-return products if we no 
longer  know  how  to  make  them  because  of  the  delegating  of  this  unprofitable 
operation? Today we see a direct relation between the sum attributed to a advertising 
campaign for clothes and the price that the consumer accepts to pay for such clothes. 
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